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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs, Tapadeera, LLC and Cary Hamilton, filed suit 
alleging defendants owed Tapadeera $23,421.01 based on 
plaintiffs' claim that defendants were in breach of a real 
property sale contract. (R.p.1) At the time of trial the parties 
entered into a settlement agreement. Plaintiff later sought 
damages alleging that defendants had breached the settlement 
agreement. (R.p.49) 
A) COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiffs filed suit on August 13, 2008. (R.p.1) In the 
complaint there were several causes of action raised. Defendants 
filed an answer (R.p.19) and raised, as to some of plaintiffs' 
causes of action, a statute of limitations defense. In response 
to this defense, on January 12, 2009, plaintiff, by filing an 
amended complaint, voluntarily dropped the challenged causes of 
action. (R.p.25) One of the dropped causes of action was based 
on a check that had been written by the Knowltons to Cary 
Hamilton. Cary Hamilton was a member of Tapadeera, LLC. Cary 
Hamilton was named as a plaintiff only because the check, on 
which one of the original causes of action had been based, had 
been made payable to C & J Construction which was a dba of Cary 
Hamilton. Tapadeera was the party in interest on the other 
causes of action. When the Amended Complaint was filed 
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plaintiffs overlooked removing Cary Hamilton's name from the 
pleadings. 
Trial was set for the 9th day of September, 2009. (Tr.p.4) 
However, prior to the court taking any testimony, the parties 
reached a settlement and so advised the court. (Tr.p.4) The 
settlement terms were then placed on the record. (Tr.pp.4-9) 
After this settlement was reached the settlement fell apart 
and plaintiffs filed a Motion for Judgment of Foreclosure. 
Plaintiffs claimed that defendants had breached the settlement 
agreement and that because of this breach the plaintiffs should 
be allowed to foreclose. A hearing was held. (Tr.pp.11-38) The 
district court denied this motion and indicated that the 
pleadings needed to be amended to add a new cause of action based 
on the plaintiff's allegations that defendants had breached the 
settlement agreement. (Tr. pp. 35 - 3 7) 
In response to the court's directive plaintiffs' filed their 
Second Amended Complaint on April 5, 2010. (R.p.49) An Amended 
Answer was filed on April 21, 2010. (R.p.65) When plaintiffs 
filed their Second Amended Complaint Cary Hamilton was dropped as 
a plaintiff. 
Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was 
supported by various affidavits. (See Stoker Stipulation to 
Augment) Defendants filed a counter affidavit. (See Jensen 
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Stipulation to Augment) A hearing was held. (Tr.pp.47-76) The 
court granted plaintiff's motion and judgment was entered for 
plaintiff. (R.p.89) Defendants then filed a Motion to Reconsider 
which motion was heard by the court on December 8, 2010. 
(Tr.pp.78-99) The court denied defendants' Motion to Reconsider. 
(R.p.94) 
Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Costs with a supporting 
affidavit. (R.pp.78-81) After the court denied defendants' Motion 
for Reconsideration an amended Memorandum of Costs and an Amended 
Affidavit were filed. (R.pp.109-112) Defendants filed an 
objection to plaintiff's request for costs and fees. (R.p.92) 
The court awarded costs but denied the request for attorney 
fees. (R.p.124) 
On January 19, 2011, defendants filed a Notice of 
Appeal. (R.p.122) Based on the court's denial of attorney fees 
plaintiff filed a Cross Appeal. (R.p.137) 
Following the filing of defendants' Notice of Appeal 
defendants filed an objection to the court heading. This 
objection was based on the heading only showing Tapadeera as a 
plaintiff. Defendants wanted to have Cary Hamilton added back in 
as a plaintiff. A hearing was held. On April 27, 2011 the court 
entered an order including Cary Hamilton as a plaintiff. (R.p.147) 
The parties have filed two stipulations to augment the 
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record. The first augments the record with the Paul Aston 
deposition and with the Knowlton affidavit that was filed in 
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The second 
stipulation provides four affidavits submitted by plaintiff in 
support of plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tapadeera owned an 8 acre parcel of land In Minidoka County. 
Tapadeera originally sold the 8 acres to a family by the name of 
Holt. The Holts wanted to build a house and they arranged 
financing for the purchase. However, the bank only wanted to 
secure its loan against two of the acres. Consequently, a legal 
description was generated for the two acres and the bank financed 
the house, taking security in the two acres. This resulted in two 
legal descriptions filed of record, one for the two acre parcel 
and one for the six acre parcel. (Aston, p.6) 
After the transaction had taken place the Holts got into 
financial difficulty which resulted in the bank foreclosing on 
the two acre parcel. Plaintiff ended up getting the 6 acres back 
because of Holts' inability to pay. 
After the two acres went back to the bank and after the 6 
acres was returned to plaintiff's ownership the defendants 
contacted plaintiff's agent, Cary Hamilton, and indicated they 
were interested in buying the 6 acre parcel. The defendants also 
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became aware of the availability of the two acre section on which 
Holts had built their home. The defendants purchased the two 
acres from the bank and entered into an agreement with plaintiff 
to purchase the 6 acres. Defendants started making payments and 
later took possession of the 6 acre parcel. (R.p.1) 
After a few payments had been made Mr. Knowlton contacted 
Cary Hamilton and requested a payoff. The amount was identified 
and Mr. Knowlton wrote a check payable to C&J Construction for 
$23,421.00. A deed was delivered to Mr. Knowlton and then 
recorded. At or about the time the deed was recorded Mr. 
Knowlton stopped payment on his check. Upon contact being made 
with Mr. Knowlton he refused to make the payment for the check 
and refused to return the property. (Plaintiff's Complaint, R. 
p.1) 
Nothing happened for about 4 years. After 4 years the 
plaintiff filed suit seeking to foreclose against the property 
and/or to collect the $23,421.00 that was owed. 
The case was set for trial but before the trial began the 
parties negotiated a settlement. The terms of the settlement 
agreement were recited in open court and placed on the record. 
(Tr.pp.4-9). The essentials of the settlement were that 
plaintiff would apply to the county to have the 8 acres 
subdivided, that defendants would cooperate in getting the 8 
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acres subdivided, and that once the subdivision was granted 
defendants would pay plaintiff $23,421.01. 
Plaintiff prepared an application to amend the subdivision 
plat, obtained the Knowlton's signature on the application, paid 
the necessary fees and costs and then submitted the application 
to the county for the eight acres to be subdivided. (Aston, p.15-
16) 
A hearing was scheduled before the planning and zoning 
committee (P&z) to get preliminary approval to subdivide the 8 
acres into two lots. For some reason the county failed to send 
notice of the hearing date to the Knowltons. (Aston, pp.20-22) 
Cary Hamilton attended the P&Z hearing and presented the request. 
P&Z gave initial approval to the subdivision and forwarded the 
application to the County Commissioners for the final approval. 
(Aston, p.23) Before any further steps could be taken to deal 
with the application Mr. Knowlton sent a letter to the county 
withdrawing the application. (Jeff Stoker Affidavit #1) (Aston, 
pp.24-25) Since Mr. Knowlton was the title owner of the full 8 
acre parcel the county would take no further steps, nor would 
they consider the application, without Mr. Knowlton's agreement. 
(Aston, pp.25-28) The county sent a letter to Cary Hamilton 
notifying plaintiff of the county's inability to take any further 
action due to Mr. Knowlton's withdrawal of the application. (Jeff 
6 
Stoker Affidavit #3) (Aston, pp.27-28) 
Plaintiff, through his attorney, sent two letters to 
defendants inviting them to reconsider their position. (Stoker 
Affidavit #3) Defendants did not respond except to confirm they 
were not going to allow the application to go forward. (Jeff 
Stoker Affidavit #3) 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court err in granting plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment? 
2. Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff's request 
for an award of attorney fees? 
3. Did the trial court err in requiring that the heading be 
amended to add Cary Hamilton as a plaintiff? 
ARGUMENT 
From a review of defendants' brief it appears defendants are 
making four arguments. The first is that there was a question of 
fact which arose because: 
Hamilton had been contacted with regard to the placement of 
the easements and had failed to take into account the 
Knowlton's concerns. (Ds' brief, p.10) 
This argument is, in essence, an argument that plaintiff 
breached its obligation, as per the settlement agreement, which 
justified defendants' breach of the agreement. 
Defendants' second argument is that because defendants did 
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not receive notice of the P&Z meeting that they were justified in 
unilaterally preventing plaintiff from going forward with the 
subdivision application. (Ds' brief, p.7) 
Defendants' third argument is that plaintiff breached the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and that this justified 
defendants "pulling the plug" on the subdivision application. (Ds' 
brief, p.13) 
Defendants raise, as their fourth challenge, the argument 
that the underlying sale agreement was "illegal" and that for 
this reason the court should invalidate the settlement agreement. 
(Ds' brief, pp.13-15) 
Defendants do not argue that the trial court was in error 
when it ruled that defendants breached the settlement agreement. 
It appears defendants have conceded they breached the agreement 
by their interference with plaintiff's ability to get the subject 
property subdivided and defendants' arguments are limited to why 
they feel they were justified in so breaching the settlement 
agreement. Before addressing defendants' four arguments 
plaintiff will address the validity of the settlement agreement 
and the reasons why defendants were in breach of this agreement. 
I. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS A VALID CONTRACT AND 
DEFENDANTS BREACHED THIS AGREEMENT 
Some general principles regarding settlement agreements, 
which are entered into with the purpose of compromising and 
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settling legal disputes, are set forth in Lawrence v. Hutchison, 
146 Idaho 892, 204 P.3d 532 (App. 2009). The court stated the 
following in regard to settlement agreements: 
Stipulations for the settlement of litigation are regarded 
with favor by the courts and will be enforced unless good 
cause to the contrary is shown. (Citations omitted) 
Generally, oral settlements do not have to be reduced to 
writing to be enforceable. (Citations omitted) Oral 
stipulations are binding when acted upon or entered on the 
court records. 146 Ida @ 898 
And also: 
An agreement entered into in good faith in order to settle 
adverse claims is binding upon the parties, and absent a 
showing of fraud, duress or undue influence, is enforceable 
either at law or in equity. (Citations omitted) 
Oral settlement agreements must comply with the requirements 
for contracts. (Citations omitted) Such a contract stands on 
the same footing as any other contract and is governed by 
the same rules that are applicable to contracts generally. 
146 Ida. @898 
The essential elements of the settlement agreement, entered 
into by the parties before Judge Crabtree, (Tr. pp.4-9) are as 
follows: 
1. Mr. Hamilton would prepare the subdivision application 
and secure the documentation required by the county, including 
the survey, to submit to Minidoka County. 
It is uncontested that Mr. Hamilton complied with these 
requirements and that the application, with supporting documents, 
was prepared and submitted to the County. 
2. The Knowltons, or either of them, was required to sign 
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the application. 
Undisputed: Defendants signed the application. 
3. Mr. Hamilton was required to submit the application to 
Minidoka County and to go forward with the proceedings before the 
county agencies. 
Undisputed: Plaintiff's Mr. Hamilton did submit all 
paperwork to Minidoka county and did appear at the P&Z hearing at 
which time P&Z recommended the approval of the subdivision, 
subject to conditions. 
4. The Knowltons were required to be "supportive and to 
assist" Mr. Hamilton in getting the subdivision application filed 
and in getting the subdivision approved. Specifically, the 
Knowltons were to "be supportive" and to "cooperate as necessary 
to get the subdivision approved." (Tr.p.5, 1.4-10) 
A written stipulation was contemplated at the time the 
settlement was placed on the record but no stipulation was ever 
filed. 
Mr. Hamilton did everything he was supposed to do. P&Z 
approved the application but, due to an error by the county, no 
notice of the P&Z meeting was ever sent to defendants. Mr. 
Hamilton had no knowledge that no notice was sent to 
defendants. (Aston, p.21-22) Following the approval by P&Z, Mr. 
Knowlton sent his February 22, 2010 letter to Minidoka County. 
10 
This letter, by its terms, absolutely negated the ability of Mr. 
Hamilton to go forward with the application for approval of the 
subdivision. (Stoker Affidavit #3) 
In reviewing the terms of the settlement agreement, (Tr. pp. 
4-9) it is clear there was a settlement agreement entered into, 
that there was a meeting of the minds, with consideration. Each 
party had certain contractual obligations based on the 
settlement. As of the time Mr. Knowlton sent his letter to 
Minidoka County Mr. Hamilton had complied with all of his 
contractual obligations. Mr. Hamilton's ability to complete his 
contractual obligations was dependent on Mr. Knowlton's 
cooperation and assistance. Mr. Knowlton, by sending the letter 
to Minidoka County withdrawing the application, not only failed 
to cooperate but negated plaintiff's ability to take any further 
action to get the subdivision approved. 
The lower court determined, as a matter of law, that the 
settlement agreement between the parties constituted a contract. 
Plaintiff submits that there should be no question that an 
agreement was entered into by the parties and defendants, in 
their brief, have not made any arguments or challenges to the 
validity of the settlement agreement. 
The doctrine of prevention of performance is applicable to 
this case and, because of defendants' unilateral action in 
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terminating plaintiff's ability to go forward with Minidoka 
County, the plaintiff was excused from obtaining, from the 
county, final approval of the proposed subdivision. 
In Ferguson v. City of Orofino, 131 Ida. 190, 193, 953 P.2d 
630(App 1998) the court discussed the pertinent doctrine as 
follows: 
The doctrine of prevention of performance excuses a party 
from fulfilling his contractual obligations when the party 
to whom the obligation is owed unlawfully prevents the first 
party from tendering performance. Sullivan v. Bullock, 124 
Idaho 738, 741-42, 864 P.2d 184, 187-188 (Ct. App.1993). See 
also John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of 
Contracts # 11-28 (3d ed. 1987) j Walter H.E. Jaeger, 
Williston on Contracts #1316 (3d ed.1968). The party whose 
performance has been prevented may be entitled to 
damages for the benefit of the bargain that would have been 
earned through performance. Sullivan, 124 Idaho at 743 
744, 864 P.2d at 189-90j Calamari, supra. 
In Sullivan, supra, the following is stated: 
A previously stated, a party who is prevented from 
performing by the party for whom the work is being done, may 
treat the contract as breached and may recover damages 
sustained. 124 Idaho @ 738 
No appellate issue has been raised by defendants concerning 
the amount of damages, to which plaintiff was entitled, or the 
trial court's decision giving defendants 30 days to pay the 
$23,421.01 or to have the foreclosure go forward. (R.pp.89-90) 
Plaintiff will now address defendants' four arguments. These 
are the same arguments defendants raised in the lower court. 
Plaintiff submits that all four arguments are frivolous, 
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unreasonable and without foundation. If the court agrees then 
such a determination will have bearing on the attorney fee issues 
hereinafter discussed. 
II. DEFENDANTS' EASEMENT ARGUMENTS ARE NOT MERITORIOUS 
Paul Aston's testimony shows why defendant's easement 
arguments are unsound. The following is a partial summary of the 
information provided by Mr. Aston's testimony: 
1. The Knowltons could have built the house they wanted to 
build on the 6 acre portion of the land they owned as long as 
they continued to have ownership of the full 8 acres. (Aston, pp. 
14-15, 32) 
2. An application for an amended subdivision was submitted 
by Cary Hamilton as per the settlement agreement. (Aston,p.1S) 
3. A plat, with easements, was also submitted. (Aston, p.16) 
4. It was required that the plat show easements for road 
access and for water supply to both parcels. (Aston, pp.16-18) 
5. The County had no concerns about where these easements 
were located so long as provision was made for road and water 
access. (Aston, p. 18 -19) 
6. Knowltons did not get notice of the P&Z hearing because 
the County computer did not print out a label. (Aston, pp.21-22) 
7. The P&Z commission approved the proposed amended 
subdivision with the condition that the irrigation easements 
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would have to be acceptable to the irrigation district and that 
the plat would have to comply with the county subdivision 
ordinance. (Aston, p.24) 
8. Following the P&Z approval the next step would have been 
for plaintiff to obtain the approval of the irrigation district 
and to then submit the matter at a hearing before the county 
commissioners for their review. (Aston, p.24) 
9. This process was stopped by the Knowlton letter of 
February 22nd, 2010. (Aston, pp.24-28) 
10. If the Knowltons had withdrawn their letter the County 
would have allowed the procedure to continue so long as the final 
approval was obtained before February 18, 2011. If defendants had 
withdrawn their letter the parties would have still had one year 
to complete the process. (Aston, p.28) 
11. The lack of notice to the Knowltons could have been 
corrected by simply re-noticing a second meeting before P&Z. 
(Aston, p. 26) 
12. The Knowltons' gripe about the easements was of no 
significance because the Knowltons could have made any changes 
they wanted with the easements before the matter was re-noticed 
before P&Z. (Aston, p.27) 
13. The Knowltons could also have dedicated additional 
easements for the water delivery and/or the road access without 
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changing the easements identified on the subdivision plat. 
(Aston, pp.36-37, 39-40) 
14. If the letter had been withdrawn the whole process could 
have been completed in 2~ to 3 months. (Aston, p.29) 
15. Mr. Aston did not anticipate that there would have been 
any problem getting the subdivision approved. (Aston, p.30-31) 
16. The 8 acre parcel did have two legal descriptions, one 
for two acres and one for six, filed of record. This had been 
done for financing purposes and was not illegal. (Aston, pp.33-34) 
Cary Hamilton had a plat prepared for the proposed 
subdivision that would have allowed defendants' 8 acre parcel to 
be divided into two lots, a 2 acre lot and a 6 acre lot. In 
order to complete the subdivision, to the satisfaction of 
Minidoka County, it was necessary that there be easements across 
the two parcels in order to make sure each lot could be accessed 
by a roadway and to make sure that water could be distributed 
from the canal source to both parcels. Easements were provided 
for on the plat which meant that those easements would have been 
dedicated easements if the subdivision had been approved. 
The fact that easements were identified on the plat, whether 
for the roadway or for the water supply, did not limit defendants 
in imposing such other easements on the property as they saw fit. 
The only County requirement was that there be provision for road 
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and water access. The county didn!t care if the Knowltons made 
provision for any other easement they saw fit. Consequently! the 
Knowltons had the unlimited right to put a roadway easement any 
place they wanted and they could also have placed a water 
easement any place they wanted. This was because they were the 
sole owners of the 8 acres which gave them the right! and 
ability! to make these decisions and changes regardless of the 
subdivision plat. 
Defendants argue that because they had some concerns about 
the location of the easements that they were justified in sending 
their letter to the County that stopped the subdivision process. 
However! as clearly demonstrated by Paul Aston!s testimony! to 
which there is no challenge in the record! defendants! easement 
concerns could have been dealt with in one of two ways. The 
first was that prior to a second hearing before P&Z the easements 
could have been changed to suit the Knowltons. The second was 
that the easements identified on the initial plat could have been 
left on the proposed plat without any change and the Knowltons 
could have created other easements later on without going back 
through the subdivision process. Defendants argument that the 
trial court was speculating! when it determined that the 
Knowltons! complaints could have been addressed with little! or 
no! difficulty if they had simply cooperated! is very weak. The 
16 
court reached the correct conclusion on this issue and 
defendants' arguments that the judge was "speculating" has no 
merit because it was defendants' actions that denied plaintiff 
the right to go forward with the process in order to find out if 
the subdivision would have ultimately been approved. 
The court is referred to the March 5, 2010 Stoker letter to 
Mr. Jensen advising that the Knowltons' "gripes" could be 
addressed and dealt with and that the plaintiffs were willing to 
meet to resolve the issues. (Stoker Aff idavi t #3) No meeting was 
ever arranged or requested by defendants. For all of these 
reasons there is no merit whatsoever to defendants' argument in 
regard to the easements. 
The defendants second argument, that they didn't receive 
notice of the P&Z meeting, 1S also without merit because, as 
heretofore indicated, the P&Z meeting could easily have been re-
noticed which would have allowed Knowltons to participate in the 
re-noticed hearing. 
III. THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO THIS CASE. 
It appears that defendants' covenant of good faith argument 
is a rehash of the easement and the notice arguments. Defendants 
argue that Cary Hamilton did something wrong or that he acted in 
bad faith but defendants fail to identify anything he did wrong 
although defendants again discuss the easement situation and the 
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notice issue. 
Returning again to the easement argument, this argument is 
not meritorious for the reasons previously set forth. Another 
reason why this argument is not meritorious is that the Knowltons 
signed the application that was submitted to the County. They 
had the opportunity, before signing the application, if they saw 
the need, to wait to sign until any issues they had were 
resolved. By signing the application defendants, it is 
submitted, waived any arguments they had to the placement of any 
easements. 
As indicated in Paul Aston's deposition, the lack of notice 
to the Knowltons was in major part because the county's computer 
did not print a label to send notice to the Knowltons. However, 
even if no notice was received this problem could easily have 
been corrected by just re-noticing the P&Z meeting at which time 
Knowltons could have appeared. The other problem with 
defendants' argument, in this regard, is that it was not Cary 
Hamilton's fault that the notice did not get to defendants-it was 
the County's. 
The other problem with defendants' argument is that even if 
they didn't receive any notice of the P&Z meeting, their 
presence, or absence, at the P&Z meeting wasn't of any 
significance unless they wanted to complain and object to the P&Z 
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approving the application. The objective was to get the 
application approved but the more one listens to defendants' 
arguments the more one becomes convinced that defendants never 
wanted the application approved because they did not want to pay 
the money. The application was approved. That should have been 
the goal for both parties and the defendants should have been 
glad that step one of the process had been completed 
successfully. 
As indicated by Paul Aston, the P&Z approval was subject to 
the condition that the irrigation company, and the County as to 
the easements, be satisfied. At the anticipated hearing before 
the County Commissioners the easement issue could have been dealt 
with and the easements moved and the Knowltons would have been 
given the opportunity to attend the hearing. 
There is a significant likelihood that the Knowltons 
intended to do whatever it took to sabotage the process had they 
attended the P&Z hearing. If the approval was obtained they had 
to pay the money which, it appears, they did not want to do. 
Another problem with defendants' "covenant of good faith and 
fair dealingH argument is that defendants are raising this as a 
defense but they did not raise this as a defense in their answer. 
(R.p.19,65) Defendants first presented this as a defense at the 
time of the summary judgment motion. 
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An analysis of the principles of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing demonstrates that if there was a breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that it was the 
defendants that breached this implied covenant. 
In Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 768, 203 
P.3d 694(2009) the general rules for the application of this 
doctrine are set forth. The following is a synopsis of these 
rules: 
1. The covenant only arises "regarding terms agreed to by 
the parties". 
2. No covenant will be implied that is contrary to the terms 
of the contract. 
3. A violation only occurs when "either party .... violates, 
nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the .. . 
contract .... " Idaho First Natl Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 
Idaho at 288, 824 P.2d at 863 (citations omitted) 
4. A person claiming a breach of this covenant must identify 
a specific term of the agreement that the other party violated, 
nullified or significantly impaired. 
5. The contract terms are not overridden by the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
The terms of the settlement agreement were that plaintiff 
would file an application to get the defendants' 8 acres 
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subdivided, that plaintiff would file the plat and otherwise take 
care of the procedural steps necessary to effectuate the 
subdividing of the property. The defendants were to cooperate 
with the process and, upon the approval of the amended 
subdivision, pay plaintiff $23,421.01. These were basically all 
of the terms. There was no term of the settlement agreement that 
discussed any easements or the location of any easements. 
Defendants' brief states that because the "placement of the 
easements and the giving of notice were important factors to the 
Knowltons" that somehow the Knowltons' displeasure with these 
issues constituted, on the part of plaintiff, a breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Defendants do not point out any term of the agreement that 
plaintiff is supposed to have violated, nullified or 
significantly impaired. As previously set forth in this brief, 
even if the easement issue needed to be addressed there was 
plenty of leeway for this to be done without the Knowltons 
sending the letter to the County that completely terminated the 
application process. 
The end result of this analysis is that the Knowltons, other 
than signing the application, did not cooperate in any way with 
the process of getting the subdivision amended. On the contrary, 
the Knowltons did everything they could to stop the process. If 
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either party breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
it was the defendants because they! in bad faith! frustrated 
plaintiff!s ability to accomplish the primary objective of the 
settlement agreement! i.e. to obtain Minidoka County!s approval 
of the subdivision of the 8 acres. 
Defendants go on to argue that whether or not the County 
would have approved the subdivision "is speculative" on the part 
of the trial court. The problem with this argument is that 
defendants! conduct! in sending the letter to the County and in 
failing to withdraw the letter after being given the opportunity 
to do so! resulted in plaintiff being denied the opportunity to 
even try to get the subdivision approved. Again! as stated by 
Mr. Aston in his deposition! he had every expectation that the 
County would have approved plaintiff!s application to amend the 
subdivision plat. (Aston! p.30-31) 
IV. THE ORIGINAL SALE AGREEMENT WAS NOT VOID BASED ON A 
VIOLATION OF AN ORDINANCE 
Defendant argues that the original real property sale 
agreement! that was entered into between the parties! was a 
contract that was void and against public policy. This argument 
is based on defendants! position that there was a provision in 
the Minidoka County Ordinance that made it a misdemeanor for any 
person to violate a provision of the subdivision/zoning 
ordinance. 
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Even if this public policy defense had any merit to start 
with! which it did not! any such defense was made moot when the 
parties entered into their settlement agreement. In addressing 
defendants! arguments in this regard plaintiff will first 
demonstrate that this defense! from the beginning! was without 
foundation in law or in fact. 
The parties entered into a real estate purchase contract 
wherein the plaintiff would sell to the defendants a six acre 
parcel of real property. (R.I) Plaintiff!s obligations! that 
constituted the consideration plaintiff was giving in the 
contractual situation! was to transfer the ownership of a six 
acre parcel to defendants. 
Defendants! argument is that the creation of two legal 
descriptions involving the 8 acres! which took place before 
defendants had any involvement whatsoever with the 8 acres! 
constituted the creation of a subdivision that did not have the 
blessing of the County Commissioners and that! therefore! there 
was an "illegal" subdivision. 
In this regard, defendants make an inaccurate statement in 
their brief, (Ds' B.p.IS) when the following is stated: 
There is no dispute in the factual record that the 
subdivision performed by Hamilton was illegal and in 
violation of the Minidoka County ordinance." 
This statement is totally misleading and incorrect. When the 
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so called "illegal subdivision" was created it was created for 
financing reasons. The Holts, who were the original buyers of 
the property from plaintiff, wanted to build a house and to do so 
they had to have bank financing. The bank only wanted security 
in a two acre parcel and so a two acre parcel was created in 
order to facilitate the financing of the home construction. As 
noted by Paul Aston, the statute prohibits land divisions for 
"developmental purposes", it does not prohibit land divisions for 
financing purposes. (Aston Depo, pp.33 34) 
The Minidoka Ordinance did not prohibit the sale or the 
transfer of ownership of real property. The County Ordinance 
only prevented a person from getting a building permit to build 
on the property if the property did not comply with the zoning 
and subdivision ordinance. 
In Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 609, 200 P.3d 1153 
(2008), there is fairly extensive discussion about contracts that 
are considered "illegal contracts". As part of this discussion 
the following is stated: 
Generally, when the consideration for a contract explicitly 
violates a statute, the contract is illegal and 
unenforceable. Barry v. Pac. W. Constr. Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 
832, 103 P.3d 440, 445(2004). In most cases the court will 
leave the parties to an illegal contract as it finds them. 
And also: 
.... (O)nly those contracts which involve consideration that 
is expressly prohibited by the relevant prohibitory statute 
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are void. See Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 352, 924 P.2d 
607, 614 (1996) ......... . 
Such statutes must be narrowly construed and only those 
contracts violating express provisions thereof will be 
deemed illegal. Id. 
The action of selling and/or transferring real property did 
not violate the Minidoka Ordinance. This was the consideration 
given by plaintiff in the transaction. There was nothing illegal 
about this action. Defendants are basically ignoring all legal 
principles about what makes a contract void because of statutory 
violation. This is a case of "don't confuse me with the facts 
because my mind is already made up". The Minidoka Ordinance had 
absolutely no provisions that were violated when plaintiff agreed 
to sell 6 acres to defendants. 
Defendant cites Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 990 
P.2d 1219(App.1999) as support for their "illegality" argument. 
However, this case is distinguishable. In Kunz the court 
determined that a lease that provided for the placement of 
illegal billboards could not be enforced. The reason for this 
was that the consideration to be given by one party, the 
placement of the billboards, was in direct violation of an 
ordinance. In the present case the sale of real property was not 
in violation of any ordinance and, in fact, no part of the 
consideration given by either party, was in violation of the 
Minidoka ordinance. 
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To the extent any argument even exists that there was a 
violation of the Minidoka ordinance, this argument is nullified 
by the fact that Knowltons ultimately purchased the 2 acre and 
the 6 acre parcels putting all the property back in the ownership 
of one person. 
The next reason defendants' argument, on this issue, fails 
is because of the settlement agreement. 
There is clearly no "illegality" defense to the settlement 
agreement. Defendants are making no such claim. Consequently, 
the only argument is as to the original sale agreement. The 
issue then arises as to what effect the settlement agreement had, 
or has, on any defenses defendants may have had to the original 
contract. 
Some principles from Idaho case law that should be 
dispositive of defendants' arguments on this issue are: 
1. An agreement entered into in good faith in order to 
settle adverse claims is binding upon the parties and absent a 
showing of fraud, duress or undue influence, is enforceable. 
Young Elec. Sign Co. v. State, 135 Idaho 804, 25 P.3d 117(2001) 
Defendants have made no claim that there was any bad faith, 
fraud, duress or undue influence involved insofar as their 
entering into the settlement agreement. There are, it is 
submitted, no other defenses that can be raised to the settlement 
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agreement. 
2. In an action brought to enforce an agreement of 
compromise and settlement, made in good faith, the court will not 
inquire into the merits or validity of the original claim. 
Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 151 P.3d 818(2007) 
As set forth in Goodman any defenses or claims defendants 
may have had to plaintiff's original causes of action, are not 
available as defenses to enforcement of the settlement agreement. 
As a result of the settlement agreement defendants' efforts to 
resurrect a defense they raised to plaintiff's original claim is 
inappropriate and without merit. 
It is submitted that all of the arguments raised by 
defendants are smoke screens. There is no substance to any of 
the four arguments raised and the arguments made seem to be 
nothing more than weak efforts to avoid paying the money owed. 
v. CARY HAMILTON WAS PROPERLY DROPPED AS A PLAINTIFF 
The judge, at the tail end of the proceedings in the lower 
court, entered an order that directed that Cary Hamilton be added 
back in as a plaintiff in this case. (R.p.147) 
After the settlement agreement fell apart the court advised 
plaintiff that if plaintiff wanted to go forward with a cause of 
action, based on the settlement agreement, that the pleadings 
needed to be amended. A Second Amended Complaint was filed and, 
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at the time of the filing, plaintiffs' counsel opted to drop Cary 
Hamilton as a plaintiff. 
A motion had been filed to do this previously but no hearing 
was ever held. At the time the original complaint was filed Cary 
Hamilton was named as a plaintiff because the check that was 
written, the check that defendants later stopped payment on, was 
made payable to C&J Construction which was Cary Hamilton's dba. 
Defendants contested the check cause of action because the 
statute of limitations had expired at the time the complaint was 
filed. Plaintiffs then voluntarily dropped the check cause of 
action. After the cause of action was dropped Cary Hamilton had 
no further interest in the action and, consequently, should have 
been dismissed as a party to the action. Plaintiffs filed their 
Second Amended Complaint on April 5, 2010. Defendants filed an 
answer. No objection was made to the dropping of Cary Hamilton 
as a plaintiff until a year after the Second Amended Complaint 
was filed. 
The court ordered that plaintiff could file a Second Amended 
Complaint. It was filed and Cary Hamilton was not listed as a 
plaintiff. Defendants should have had some obligation, if they 
saw fit, to note any objection they may have had to Cary Hamilton 
being dropped as a plaintiff when they filed their answer. Even 
using the time limits in Rule 60(b) suggests that after 6 months 
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defendants have waived any objection they might have had to the 
dropping of Cary Hamilton as a plaintiff. For these reasons it 
is suggested that the trial court erred in entering the order 
requiring that Cary Hamilton be included as a plaintiff. 
VI. PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES 
Plaintiff requested attorney fees in the trial court. 
Defendants objected but their objection was limited to an 
objection that the fees were excessive. (R.p.92) Costs were 
awarded but the request for fees was denied. (R. p.124) Plaintiff 
appealed from the court's ruling on this issue. Plaintiff 
submits that attorney fees should have been awarded for a portion 
of the legal fees plaintiff incurred. 
Plaintiff submitted, as part of the Memorandum of Costs and 
the supporting Affidavit, a full history of the legal work that 
was involved with the case. The fees can be addressed in their 
totality but they also can be divided and plaintiff submits that 
the fees should be addressed under two separate classifications. 
The first classification is the legal fees plaintiff incurred 
prior to the date of the settlement agreement. The second is the 
fees that were incurred following the time the parties entered 
into the settlement agreement on 9/9/09. 
Plaintiff's counsel devoted, as of the time the amended 
costs and fee bill was submitted to the court, a total of 108.33 
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hours. (R.pp.112-119) Of this total plaintiff's counsel devoted 
66.03 hours prior to the settlement of 9/9/09 and 42.3 hours were 
devoted to the case following the time the parties entered into 
the settlement agreement. Plaintiff's hourly rate was $200 per 
hour which breaks down as follows: presettlement: $13,206.00, 
post settlement: $8,460.00. 
There is no question that plaintiff was the prevailing party 
in this case. Plaintiff requested fees under I.C. 12-120 and 
under I.C. 12-121. (R. pp.112-113) 
Plaintiff submits that fees should have been awarded for the 
total amount of time involved in going forward with the case. 
However, at a minimum the trial court should have awarded 
plaintiff the fees incurred to enforce the settlement agreement. 
Plaintiff suggests that there are two reasons why post 
settlement fees should be awarded. The first is under I.C. 12-
120 and the second is under I.C. 12-121. 
VII. FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED BASED ON I.C. 12-120 
When the parties entered into the settlement agreement the 
case was basically resolved from the Knowltons' standpoint 
because, after the agreement was entered into, the Knowltons 
really didn't have to do anything but sign the application that 
was to be submitted to the County to have the amended subdivision 
approved. Plaintiff was responsibile to pay the costs and to 
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take the action necessary to get the subdivision approved. 
Defendants' only other obligation was to pay plaintiff, after 
plaintiff finished the subdivision process, the sum of 
$23,421.01. 
After defendants, without justification, sent the letter to 
the County withdrawing the subdivision application the plaintiff 
was entitled to receive, as damages, the sum of $23,421.01 from 
defendants. Plaintiffs, after the settlement agreement was 
reached and then breached, sent two separate letters to 
defendants requesting that defendants either withdraw their 
opposition to the subdivision process or requesting the payment 
of the $23,421.01. (See Stoker Affidavit #3) The first of these 
letters was sent on February 23, 2010 and the second was sent on 
March 5, 2010. Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint, 
adding the cause of action based on the settlement agreement, on 
April 5, 2010. 
I.C. 12-120 normally applies to a situation where a 
complaint is filed after a 10 day written demand for payment. 
However, it is submitted that in this situation the Second 
Amended Complaint became the complaint for damages based on the 
settlement agreement. The demand letter was sent on February 
23rd and the suit was filed more than 10 days after the demand 
letter was sent. Plaintiff submits that the provisions of I.C. 
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12-120 are applicable, as to the settlement agreement, and 
attorney fees should have been awarded by the trial court, if not 
for the full amount of legal fees, then, at a minimum, for legal 
fees incurred after 9/9/10. 
VIII. ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED BASED ON I.C. 12-121. 
Attorney fees, under I.C. 12-121, may be awarded if the 
defenses raised are frivolous, unreasonable or without 
foundation. See, e.g., Jerry J. Joseph v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 
789 P.2d 1146 (App.1990) 
Attorney fees should be awarded when there is no legitimate, 
triable issue of fact and where a party asserts legal or factual 
issues which have no support in the law or the facts. See, e.g., 
Turner v. Willis, 119 Idaho 1023, 812 P.2d 737(1991) 
The award of attorney fees, under I.C. 12-121, is a matter 
of discretion and it is necessary that the court determine that 
there was an abuse of discretion before the court will overrule 
the trial court's exercise of discretion. See, e.g., Treasure 
valley Concrete, Inc. v. state, 132 Idaho 673, 978 P.2d 233(1999) 
The trial court did deny attorney fees under I.C. 12-121 but 
only makes the following statement as to said denial: 
The court does not find that the defendant's defense was 
brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to an 
award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-
121. (R.p.128) 
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The test, to determine if a trial court abused it's 
discretion in failing to award fees, is a three-factor test. The 
three steps are set forth in Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 
486, 65 P.3d 502(2003), as follows: 
To determine whether the award of attorney fees was an abuse 
of discretion this Court applies the three-factor test from 
Sun Valley Shopping Center: \ () whether the trial court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretionj (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of 
its discretion and consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to itj and (3) 
whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power 
Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000(1991)' 
The trial court properly determined that awarding fees under 
12-121 was a matter of discretion. However, it is submitted that 
the trial court's decision does not meet the other two aspects of 
the "three-factor test". 
It should be noted that plaintiff only sought fees, under 
12-121, for the attorney fees that were required to enforce the 
settlement agreement. (R.p.113) The trial court, in its decision, 
does not tell us whether or not the court was looking at the 
totality of the case, which would include the defenses raised to 
the original causes of action, when the court made the 
determination that "defendant's defense" was not frivolous, etc. 
Consequently, it is impossible to tell whether or not the court 
did, or did not, decide that defendants' four arguments raised to 
the cause of action to enforce the settlement agreement were 
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frivolous or not. 
The next problem with the court!s decision is that the court 
states that it did not find that the "defendants defense"! in the 
singular! was raised frivolously, etc. It is impossible to know 
which of the so-called defenses defendants presented is the one 
the court determined was legitimate. 
The third problem lies with whether or not the "trial court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Plaintiff 
submits that it did not. 
Although set forth previously! defendants have never argued 
that they did not breach the agreement by failing to cooperate. 
There only arguments have been that they were justified in 
withdrawing the application that had been submitted to the 
County, and thereby breaching their obligation to "cooperate"! 
because of the following reasons: 1) the easement argument; 2) 
the notice issue; 3) the good faith and fair dealing argument; 
and 4) the public policy argument based on defendants! argument 
that the original sale agreement was void because of the Minidoka 
subdivision argument. 
As hereinbefore discussed there is! and was! absolutely no 
justification for the four arguments defendants have made. This 
becomes even more evident in light of the two letters sent to 
defense counsel wherein plaintiff endeavored to convince 
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defendants that plaintiff was willing to work out any problems 
that existed with the application. If defendants had met, as 
requested, with plaintiff then the easement issue could have been 
addressed. It really didn't matter to plaintiff where the 
easements were placed. Plaintiff had nothing to gain, or lose, 
by the location of the easements and so there was no reason why 
plaintiff would not have been willing to make those changes. As 
to the notice problem, it would not have been any major problem 
to just re-notice the P&Z meeting which would have allowed 
defendants to attend the P&Z meeting. 
As previously set forth the argument about the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing is nothing more than the easement and 
notice arguments wrapped up in a different package. It is 
submitted that neither the case law, or the facts involved, give 
any justification to the defendants' covenant of good faith 
argument. 
Finally, there is no basis in case law, or in the undisputed 
facts of this case, that justify raising the argument that the 
court is, by enforcing the settlement agreement, enforcing a 
contract that is void and against public policy. 
Because defendants had absolutely no justifiable defense to 
the enforcement of the settlement agreement there was no basis 
for the court to make any determination other than a 
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determination that the defendants' four defenses were frivolous, 
etc. 
IX. ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF FOR 
THE APPELLATE WORK 
Plaintiff seeks attorney fees on appeal under I.C. 12-
120(1), based on I.C. 12-121/123 and based on Rules 11 and 54. 
Plaintiff incorporates, as part of this request, the discussions 
hereinbefore set forth in this brief concerning why the trial 
court should have awarded fees. 
Under 12-120, the amount plead in the Second Amended 
Complaint was under $25,OOO.00(R.p.53-55), a demand letter was 
sent more than 10 days before the filing of the Second Amended 
Complaint (Stoker Affidavit #3) and the amount awarded was less 
than $25,OOO.00(R.p.89). Consequently, fees should be awarded for 
the appeal. 
In regard to the award of fees based on I.C. 12-121, the 
following principles appear to be applicable: 
1. If all an appeal does is invite the appellate court to 
second guess the trial court then fees should be awarded. 
DeChambeau v. Estate of Smith, 132 Idaho 568, 976 P.2d 922(1999); 
Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 1891 P.3d 435(2007) 
There is nothing in defendants' brief that does any more 
than ask the appellate court to "second guess" the trial court. 
2. If a party's appellate arguments totally lack foundation 
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then an award of fees is appropriate. 
Idaho 561, 97 P.3d 428(2004) 
Karson v. Harris, 140 
Defendants, in their brief, provide no reason why the 
easement and notice issues could not have been addressed, and 
dealt with, if the defendants had withdrawn their opposition to 
the county entertaining the subdivision application. In fact, 
the information available to the trial court established that the 
easement issue was no issue at all, the notice issue could have 
been dealt with by re-noticing the P&Z hearing and the public 
policy statutory argument never was supported by any law or 
facts, especially in regard to the settlement agreement on which 
the summary judgment was based. 
3. Both an attorney and his client can be held responsible 
for attorney fees when there is no good faith basis for an 
appeal. MacLeod v. Reed, 126 Idaho 669, 889 P.2d 103 (App.1995) 
The attorney has the duty to determine that there is a 
legitimate basis for an appeal before he ever files it and both 
the attorney, and the defendants, in this matter knew, or should 
have known, that the appeal was brought in bad faith and that the 
four arguments raised were not meritorious. 
4. If the position advocated by a party is "plainly 
fallacious and, therefore not fairly debatable" then fees should 
be awarded. Associates NW, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 60S, 733 
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.p . 2 d 8 2 4 (19 8 7 ) 
It is submitted that the facts in this case, and the 
applicable legal principles, overwhelmingly suggest that the 
present appeal is without foundation and the trial court's ruling 
granting the summary judgment is not "fairly debatable". 
CONCLUSION 
, 
For the reasons set forth in this brief the court should 
uphold the trial court's granting of summary judgment on the 
settlement agreement, should award fees and costs on appeal and 
should remand this matter to the trial court to complete the 
foreclosure process if the monies owed are not paid. 
Respectfully submitted this ;;2& day of September, 2011. 
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